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Abstract	
Some	philosophers	believe	that	we	can,	in	theory,	justifiably	pre-punish	people	–	that	is,	
punish	them	for	a	crime	before	they	have	committed	that	crime.	In	particular,	it	has	been	
claimed	that	retributivists	ought	(in	principle)	to	accept	pre-punishment.	The	question	of	
whether	pre-punishment	can	be	justified	has	sparked	an	interesting	and	growing	
philosophical	debate.	In	this	paper	I	look	at	a	slightly	different	question:	whether	retributivists	
who	accept	that	pre-punishment	can	be	justified	should	prefer	(ordinary)	post-punishment	or	
pre-punishment,	or	see	them	(in	principle)	as	on	a	par.	The	answer	is	complex:	asking	this	
question	brings	to	light	unrecognised	distinctions	within	both	retributivism	and	pre-
punishment,	giving	us	four	different	answers	to	the	question,	depending	on	what	kind	of	
retributivism	and	what	kind	of	pre-punishment	are	combined.	Surprisingly,	given	that	it	is	
usually	presented	as	a	second	best,	to	be	pursued	only	when	post-punishment	is	unavailable,	
some	combinations	will	find	pre-punishment	preferable.	
	
I	Introduction	
Some	philosophers	have	argued	that	we	may	(in	theory1)	justifiably	pre-punish	people	–	that	is,	
we	may	punish	them	for	a	crime	prior	to	them	committing	that	crime.	Christopher	New,	who	
                                                
*	This	paper	shares	a	common	ancestor	with	my	‘Time	and	Retribution’	so	I	am,	again,	grateful	to	all	
those	who	provided	comments	on	that	paper,	in	particular	Saul	Smilansky,	as	well	as	to	two	anonymous	
referees	for	this	journal.	I	am	also	grateful	to	Joseph	Adams	for	useful	exchanges	prompted	by	his	own	
recent	paper	on	this	topic.	I	should,	perhaps,	note	at	the	outset,	that	I	am	not	a	retributivist,	or	at	least	
not	a	committed	one.	However,	this	paper	forms	part	of	a	series	of	engagements	with	retributivist	
theory,	in	an	attempt	to	deepen	my	own,	and	our	collective,	understanding	of	retributivist	theory	and	
its	entailments.	
1	As	with	all	discussions	of	pre-punishment,	I	am	going	to	set	aside	our	epistemic	limitations	concerning	
the	future.	Pre-punishment	arguably	requires	that	we	have	perfect	(or	at	least	excellent)	foreknowledge	
of	two	possible	worlds	–	the	world	in	which	we	pre-punish,	and	the	world	in	which	we	don’t.	We	should	
pre-punish	only	if	the	crime	will	be	committed	in	both,	since	it	seems	wrong	to	pre-punish	for	a	crime	
that	will	be	committed	only	if	we	pre-punish	(especially	if	the	pre-punishment	is	causally	involved	in	
the	commission	of	the	crime	–	see	Roy	Sorensen,	‘Future	Law:	Prepunishment	and	the	Theory	of	Casual	
Verdicts’	in	Nous	40	(2006):	166-183;	Stephen	Kears,	‘Compatibalism	can	Resist	Prepunishment:	a	reply	
to	Smilansky’	in	Analysis	68	(2008):	250-253,	at	p.	252.)	
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was	the	first	philosopher	to	investigate	the	idea,	motivated	the	concept	of	pre-punishment	
with	this	example:	
Ben,	a	philosophical	Alaskan	traffic	policeman,	and	Algy,	an	eccentric	casuistical	
speedster,	both	know	that	Algy	now	intends,	will	continue	to	intend,	and	will	
eventually	carry	out	his	intention	to	exceed	the	speed	limit	on	a	remote,	unpatrolled,	
but	radar-surveyed	stretch	of	Wilderness	One	at	10.31	tomorrow	morning	…	Algy,	
whilst	remaining	out	of	reach,	radios	Ben	with	the	following	offer:	If	Ben	issues	the	
fixed	penalty	summons	for	this	violation	before	it	occurs,	he	will	pay	the	fine	before	he	
commits	the	offence.	But	if	Ben	does	not	issue	the	summons	until	after	the	offence,	
Algy	will	skip	the	country	and	avoid	paying	the	fine.2	
	
Should	Ben	accept	Algy’s	offer	and	pre-punish	him?	New	argues	explicitly	that	retributivists	in	
particular	ought	to	endorse	pre-punishment.3	Joseph	Q.	Adams	has	recently	further	defended	
this	idea,	stating	that	retributivists	are	fundamentally	committed	to	‘diachronic	justice’	–	the	
idea	that	injuries	at	one	time	can	be	rectified	by	punishment	at	another.	And,	according	to	
Adams,	there	is	nothing	in	diachronic	justice	that	prefers	rectification	after	the	fact:	
The	essential	idea	of	rectification	is	a	need	to	maintain	justice	over	time	through	a	
justice-promoting,	counter-action.	Yet,	a	balanced	equilibrium	is	achieved	whether	we	
punish	before	or	after	the	offense;	diachronic	justice	is	secured	just	as	well	either	way.4	
	
In	this	paper	I	want	to	further	investigate	the	relationship	between	pre-punishment	and	
retributivism.	In	particular,	I	want	to	ask	whether	retributivists	who	accept	the	arguments	of	
New	and	Adams,	and	therefore	accept	the	permissibility	of	pre-punishment,	should	actually,	
in	principle,	prefer	pre-punishment	to	ordinary	punishment.5	Discussions	of	pre-punishment	
                                                
2	Christopher	New,	‘Time	and	Punishment’	in	Analysis	52	(1992):	35-40	at	pp.	35-36.	New’s	example	is	
complicated	by	introducing	consent	into	Algy’s	pre-punishment.	I	will	set	that	aspect	aside	in	my	
discussion.	
3	Ibid.,	p.	37-38.	See	also:	Saul	Smilansky,	‘The	Time	to	Punish’	in	Analysis	54	(1994):	50-53,	at	p.	50.	
4	Joseph	Q.	Adams,	‘Retributive	Prepunishment’	in	Social	Theory	and	Practice	39	(2013):	213-222,	at	p.	
216.	Relatedly,	Shelly	Kagan	endorses	a	view	about	desert	which	he	calls	the	‘whole	life	approach’,	in	
which	what	matters	is	that	people	get	what	they	deserve	across	their	whole	lives.	If	the	retributivist	
belief	that	punishment	promotes	desert	is	coupled	with	this	‘whole	life	approach’,	then	we	have	a	
retributivist	basis	for	pre-punishment.	Shelly	Kagan,	The	Geometry	of	Desert	(New	York:	Oxford	
University	Press,	2012),	pp.	10-12.	
5	It	is	more	interesting	to	explore	the	relationship	between	pre-punishment	and	theories	which	focus	on	
the	intrinsic	justice	of	punishment,	since	those	that	focus	exclusively	on	punishment’s	extrinsic	benefits	
(e.g.	deterrence),	whilst	accepting	pre-punishment,	will	fairly	obviously	prefer	whichever	of	pre-	and	
post-punishment	begets	the	best	extrinsic	benefits. 
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usually,	at	least	implicitly,	look	at	whether	it	can	be	justified	as	a	second	best.	They	do	this	by	
removing	the	possibility	of	ordinary,	post-hoc	punishment	(hereafter,	post-punishment)	from	
the	equation,	as	in	New’s	original	example.	We	are	asked	to	consider	whether	in	such	
circumstances,	where	we	must	choose	between	pre-punishment	or	no	punishment	at	all,	pre-
punishment	could	be	justified.6	At	the	same	time,	however,	we	are	told	that	endorsing	pre-
punishment	rests	on	the	claim	that	‘we	should	have	no	reason	to	prefer	postpunishment	to	
prepunishment’7,	which	suggests	that	if	pre-punishment	is	justified,	it	will	be,	in	principle,	on	
a	level	footing	with	post-punishment.	
	
Some	are	sceptical	as	to	whether	there	is	any	point	in	thinking	about	pre-punishment,	since	
we	clearly	lack	the	epistemic	faculties	required	to	justifiably	pre-punish	people	(although,	
worryingly,	some	legal	scholars	have	argued	that	some	recent	measures	look	a	lot	like	pre-
punishment8).	I	think	it	both	important	and	interesting.	In	large	part,	this	is	because	thinking	
about	pre-punishment	helps	us	to	think	about	our	ordinary	post-punishment	practices.	Is	our	
practice	of	only	post-punishing	simply	contingent	on	our	inability	to	see	the	future	as	well	as	
we	see	the	past?	Advocates	of	the	permissibility	of	pre-punishment	say	yes.	But	we	can	also	
ask	whether	which	of	pre-punishment	and	post-punishment	we	should	prefer.	I	will	show	that	
if	a	certain	kind	of	retributivist	accepts	the	permissibility	of	pre-punishment	in	a	certain	way,	
then	she	will	always	view	it	as	superior	to	post-punishment.	Other	retributivists	will	believe	
pre-punishment	to	be	at	least	sometimes	preferable.	Therefore,	they	will	believe	not	only	that	
our	practice	of	only	post-punishing	is	contingent	on	our	epistemic	limitations,	but	also	that	
                                                
6	Adams’	‘Retributive	Prepunishment’	is	the	first	attempt	I	have	seen	to	compare	pre-	and	post-
punishment,	although	it	offers	only	contingent	reasons	for	retributivists	to	prefer	either:	all	else	equal,	
neither	is	intrinsically	preferable.	
7	New,	‘Time	and	Punishment’,	p.	38.	See	also:	Adams,	‘Retributive	Prepunishment’,	p.	216:	retributivists	
are	‘indifferent	to	the	timing	of	the	justice-promoting	action’.	
8	Lucia	Zedner,	‘Preventive	Justice	or	Pre-punishment?	The	Case	of	Control	Orders’	in	Current	Legal	
Problems	60	(2007):	174-203.	
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those	limitations	are	to	be	regretted,	since	pre-punishment	is	preferable	but	is	made	
impossible	by	said	limitations.9	
	
For	argument’s	sake,	I	will	assume	throughout	this	article	that	pre-punishment	is	(in	
principle)	justifiable.	This	is	obviously	controversial,	and	the	existing	literature	on	pre-
punishment	is	devoted	to	exploring	what	I	am	simply	assuming	here.10	But	I	do	so	in	order	to	
focus	on	the	question	of	whether	those	(and	in	particular	those	within	the	retributivist	
tradition)	who	accept	that	pre-punishment	is	justifiable	should	view	it	as	inferior	to,	superior	
to,	or	on	a	par	with	post-punishment.	
	
The	answer	is	not	simple.	I	will	show	that	how	the	retributivist	thinks	about	pre-punishment	
will	depend	both	on	exactly	how	she	specifies	her	retributivism,	and	in	particular	its	
relationship	to	time,	and	how	she	understands	justified	pre-punishment.	To	this	end,	I	will,	in	
the	next	two	sections,	delineate	two	variants	of	retributivism	(Time-Sensitive	Retributivism	
and	In	the	End	Retributivism)	and	two	variants	of	pre-punishment	(Pre-Desert	and	Debt).	This	
gives	us	a	two-by-two	matrix	of	positions	combining	retributivism	and	the	justifiability	of	pre-
punishment,	with	four	combinations	in	total.	Each	combination	answers	our	central	question	
differently:	two	combinations	consider	it	at	least	possible	that	pre-punishment	is	preferable	to	
post-punishment,	with	one	of	those	asserting	that	it	is	always	preferable	to	pre-punish;	one	
combination	is	fully	neutral	between	pre-	and	post-punishment;	and	the	final	version	
(probably)	prefers	post-punishment	(given	other	plausible	claims).	It	is	particularly	interesting	
                                                
9	Of	course,	such	limitations	may	still	be	all-things-considered	celebrated	even	if	they	are	regretted	for	
this	reason. 
10	As	well	as	the	articles	already	mentioned,	see:	Christopher	New	‘Punishing	Times:	Reply	to	Smilanksy’	
in	Analysis	55	(1995):	60-62;	Daniel	Statman,	‘The	Time	to	Punish	and	the	Problem	of	Moral	Luck’	in	
Journal	of	Applied	Philosophy	14	(1997):	129-135;	Saul	Smilansky,	‘Determinism	and	Pre-punishment:	the	
radical	nature	of	compatibilism’	in	Analysis	67	(2007):	347-349;	Helen	Beebee,	‘Smilansky’s	alleged	
Refutation	of	Compatibalism’	in	Analysis	68	(2008):	258-260;	Saul	Smilansky,	‘More	Prepunishment	for	
Compatibalists:	a	reply	to	Beebee’	in	Analysis	68	(2008):	260-263;	Michael	Robinson,	‘A	Compatibilist-
Friendly	Rejection	of	Prepunishment’	in	Philosophia	38	(2010):	589-594.	
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that	two	combinations	assert	that	pre-punishment	could	be	preferable	to	post-punishment,	
since	this	reveals	that	pre-punishment	is	not	automatically	a	second-best,	and	that	supporters	
of	pre-punishment	are	not	necessarily	committed	to	the	claim	that,	at	the	level	of	principle,	
there	is	no	moral	distinction	between	pre-	and	post-punishment.	
	
II	Two	Versions	of	Retributivism	
The	general	definition	of	retributivism	I	will	use	here	starts	with	the	concept	of	desert.11	The	
basic	retributivist	claim,	for	our	purposes,	is	that	criminals	deserve	punishment.	Deserved	
punishment	brings	about	retributive	justice,	and	this	is	something	intrinsically	valuable	
and/or	to	be	pursued.	Retributivists	so-defined	do	not	necessarily	believe	that	retributive	
justice	provides	the	whole	truth	about	the	justification	of	punishment,	but	rather	that	it	plays,	
at	least,	some	role.	Everything	I	say	hereafter	concerns	whether	the	retributivist	should	prefer	
pre-	or	post-punishment	qua	retributivist	–	other	values	or	concerns	may	point	in	different	
directions.		
	
For	our	purposes	here,	there	are	two	different	ways	to	understand	retributivism	which	are	
importantly	different.12	They	differ	on	whether	the	temporal	distance	between	crime	and	
punishment	matters.	To	see	the	difference,	consider	the	post-punishments	of	Anna	and	
Mattie.	They	commit	a	crime	together,	and	are	equally	deserving	of	punishment.	Anna	is	
punished	immediately,	while	Mattie	is	initially	left	unpunished,	eventually	being	punished	ten	
years	later.13	Our	two	versions	of	retributivism	differ	on	how	they	view	these	two	punishments	
                                                
11	As	is	well-known,	‘retributivism’	is	a	broad	church	(John	Cottingham,	‘Varieties	of	Retribution’	in	
Philosophical	Quarterly	29	(1979):	238-246;	Nigel	Walker,	‘Even	More	Varieties	of	Retribution’	in	
Philosophy	74	(1999):	595-605)	and	so	some	stipulation	is	perhaps	inevitable.	
12	I	draw	here	on	my	‘Time	and	Retribution’	in	Law	and	Philosophy	33	(2014):	655–682.	There,	I	
distinguish	between	In	the	End,	Brute	Time,	and	Existing	Bad	Person	views.	For	present	purposes,	the	
latter	two	are	collapsed	into	Time-Sensitive	Retributivism.	
13	An	anonymous	referee	has	pointed	out	to	me	that,	in	being	made	to	wait/anticipate	punishment,	
Mattie	may	have	actually	received	more	punishment	than	Anna.	It	is	controversial	whether	experiences	
such	as	the	anticipation	of	punishment	can	count	as	punishment	–	this	is	dependent	upon	what	the	
6	
 
vis-à-vis	one	another.	According	to	In	the	End	Retributivists,	what	matters	is	that	deserved	
punishment	is	delivered	in	the	end,	so	the	two	cases	are	equally	satisfactory	at	the	bar	of	
retributive	justice	–	it	doesn’t	matter	how	long	it	takes	for	justice	to	be	done,	so	long	as	it	is	
done,	as	it	is	in	both	cases	here.	According	to	Time-Sensitive	Retributivists,	Anna’s	punishment	
is	better	or	preferable,	since	in	the	case	of	Mattie	there	is	a	period	of	ten	years	of	a	
retributively	unjust	state	of	affairs,	eventually	rectified	with	his	punishment,	whilst	in	Anna’s	
case	there	was	hardly	any	period	of	retributive	injustice.	
	
Time-Sensitive	Retributivism	is	motivated	by	the	thought	that	there	is	something	amiss	with	
the	world	when	a	crime	is	committed.	There	is	a	distance	between	how	the	world	is	and	how	it	
ought	to	be	–	a	morally	bad	state	of	affairs	–	and	that	punishment	somehow	closes	or	reduces	
this	distance.	Once	punishment	is	enacted,	justice	is	done.	It	seems	plausible	to	endorse	the	
following	general	principle:	A	morally	bad	state	of	affairs	should	be	rectified	sooner	rather	
than	later.	Therefore,	if	there	is	a	distance	between	the	world	as	it	is	and	as	it	ought	to	be,	it	
should	be	closed	or	reduced	as	quickly	as	possible	(when	all	else	is	equal).	For	example,	if	I	
have	wronged	you	and	owe	you	compensation,	it	seems	all	else	equal	preferable	that	I	
compensate	you	as	soon	as	possible,	and	that	a	world	in	which	you	are	compensated	
immediately	is	(all	else	equal)	better	than	one	in	which	you	must	wait.	The	Time-Sensitive	
Retributivist	believes	something	similar	is	true	for	retributive	punishment.	Therefore,	the	
Time-Sensitive	Retributivist	views	Anna’s	punishment	as	preferable,	as	the	retributive	
injustice	does	not	exist	for	as	long	–	justice	is	brought	about,	and	the	gap	is	closed,	sooner	
rather	than	later.	
	
III	Two	Versions	of	Pre-punishment	
                                                                                                                                                  
correct	‘metric’	or	‘currency’	of	punishment	is,	and	whether	punishment	must	be	intentionally	imposed.	
I	intend	to	remain	neutral	on	such	issues	here,	and	so	stipulate	that	after	ten	years	Mattie	receives	the	
same	punishment	as	Anna,	however	that	is	to	be	calculated	(i.e.,	if	anticipation	matters,	he	receives	a	
suitably	reduced	sentence.)	
7	
 
As	I	have	said,	pre-punishment	involves	punishing	someone	for	a	crime	before	they	commit	
that	crime.	There	are	two	ways	to	understand	pre-punishment,	which	have	yet	to	be	properly	
decoupled	in	the	literature.	One	way	to	understand	the	justifiability	of	pre-punishment,	from	
a	retributive	perspective,	is	to	say	that	people	can	deserve	punishment	prior	to	committing	a	
crime.	Thus,	if	you	will	definitely	murder	someone	tomorrow,	then	you	already	deserve	
punishment	now.	Let’s	call	this	the	Pre-Desert	version	of	pre-punishment.	There	are	two	
different	variants	of	the	Pre-Desert	view.	One,	proposed	by	Daniel	Statman14,	says	that	if	we	
know	that	you	will	definitely	murder	someone	in	set	of	circumstances	A	tomorrow,	then	we	
know	that	you	are	the	kind	of	person	who	will	murder	in	circumstances	A,	and	it	is	being	that	
kind	of	person	which	is	deserving	of	punishment.	I	am	not	convinced	that	this	is	really	a	
species	of	pre-punishment.15	Instead,	it	relegates	the	‘act	requirement’	of	the	criminal	law	to	a	
merely	evidentiary	role,	and	admits	future	conduct	as	suitable	evidence.	But	the	punishment	
is	for	present	characteristics	–	being	the	kind	of	person	who	will	murder.	Indeed,	on	this	view,	
those	who	will	never	murder,	but	who	would	murder	if	they	found	themselves	in	
circumstances	A,	deserve	punishment,	as	it	is	simply	moral	luck	that	they	will	never	find	
themselves	in	those	circumstances.	Therefore,	having	a	wrongful	or	criminal	act	in	your	future	
is	not	a	necessary	condition	of	deserving	punishment.	
	
However,	another	way	to	understand	the	Pre-Desert	version	of	pre-punishment	is	that	being	
someone	who	has	a	murder	in	their	future	(and,	possibly,	having	a	certain	kind	of	
psychological	connection	to	the	person	who	will	commit	the	murder16)	makes	you	deserving	of	
punishment	now.	Crucially,	unlike	the	Statman	view,	it	is	actually	having	a	murder	in	your	
                                                
14	Statman,	‘The	Time	to	Punish	and	the	Problem	of	Moral	Luck’.	
15	For	example,	Douglas	Husak	holds	an	almost	exactly	identical	position	regarding	the	punishment	of	
would-be	‘mega	terrorists’,	without	making	any	reference	to	pre-punishment.	See	his	‘Preventive	
Detention	as	Punishment?	Some	Possible	Obstacles’	in	Andrew	Ashworth,	Lucia	Zedner	and	Patrick	
Tomlin,	Prevention	and	the	Limits	of	the	Criminal	Law	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2013).	
16	Those	who	hold	a	Parfitian	understanding	of	the	persistence	of	personal	identity	would	endorse	this	
parenthetical	clause	(see	Derek	Parfit,	Reasons	and	Persons	(Oxford:	Clarendon	Press,	1984),	part	III).	
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future	that	makes	you	deserving,	not	merely	being	the	type	who	will	murder	–	you	are	still	
punished	for	the	act.17	
	
Another	way	to	view	justified	pre-punishment	can	be	called	the	Debt	version.18	On	this	
understanding,	the	offender	only	becomes	deserving	of	punishment	once	they’ve	committed	
the	crime.	By	pre-punishing	we	punish	someone	who	does	not	currently	deserve	punishment,	
but	whom	we	know	will	later	deserve	punishment.	It	therefore	creates	a	retributive	injustice	to	
punish	them	before	the	crime,	with	retributive	justice	being	(re)established	once	the	crime	is	
committed.	How	could	creating	such	injustice	be	justified?	Because	if	we	fail	to	pre-punish,	
there	will	also	be	a	retributive	injustice.	Either	the	offender	won’t	be	punished	(as	in	New’s	
example)	or,	if	we	punish	after	the	crime,	the	period	between	the	crime	and	the	delivery	of	the	
punishment	will	also	be	a	period	of	retributive	injustice,	as	in	Mattie’s	case.	Think	of	it	like	a	
market	transaction	–	things	are	out	of	kilter	when	goods	have	been	provided	and	no	payment	
received,	or	when	payment	is	received	and	no	goods	have	been	provided.	One	party	is	in	debt	
to	the	other.	Parity	is	restored	when	the	other	party	pays	what	they	owe	(payment	or	goods).	
When	we	post-punish,	the	offender	is	in	‘debt’	and	we	must	extract	‘payment’	to	restore	
justice.	With	pre-punishment,	the	offender	‘pre-pays’,	creating	an	injustice,	and	justice	is	
restored	once	they	commit	the	crime.19	
                                                
17	Some	of	New’s	comments	point	in	this	direction	–	he	argues	against	the	claim	that	‘a	person	does	not	
become	guilty,	and	so	deserve	the	penalty,	until	he	actually	commits	(has	committed?)	an	offence’.	
(‘Time	and	Punishment’,	p.	37.	Emphasis	in	original).	Smilansky	interprets	pre-punishment	in	this	way	
(‘The	Time	to	Punish’,	p.	51;	‘More	Prepunishment	for	Compatibilists’,	p.	261). 
18	Some	of	New’s	comments	point	in	this	direction,	and	he	uses	a	debt	analogy	to	explain	pre-
punishment.	See	‘Time	and	Punishment’,	p.	37.	See	also	Adams’	statement	of	a	Herbert	Morris-esque	
view	of	pre-punishment	in	‘Retributive	Prepunishment’,	p.	219.	
19	A	potential	objection	to	this	line	of	thinking	is	that	it	seems	to	entail	that	once	his	sentence	is	served	
the	offender	is	‘owed’	or	‘deserves’	his	crime.	Since	it	is	not	my	aim	to	defend	the	justifiability	of	pre-
punishment	here,	I	will	not	try	to	defend	it	against	this	line	of	criticism.	I	will,	however,	offer	three	
thoughts	about	how	such	a	defence	might	go.	The	first	is	that	similar	objections	can	be	levelled	against	
payment	analogies	for	retributive	post-punishment	and,	indeed,	compensation,	in	that	since	they	seem	
to	suggest	that	once	the	offender/tortfeasor	has	‘paid	back’	then	all	is	well	with	the	world.	This	could	be	
taken	to	suggest	that	they	were	entitled	to	their	crime/tort	provided	they	were	willing	to	pay	the	price.	
But	we	know	that	this	is	not	the	case	–	especially	in	the	case	of	punishment,	the	whole	point	is	that	the	
offender	wasn’t	entitled	to	act	in	that	way.	If	post-punishment	retributivism	and	compensation	can	
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IV	Should	Retributivists	Prefer	Pre-punishment?	
Whether	the	retributivist	should	view	pre-punishment	as	superior,	inferior,	or	on	a	par	with	
post-punishment	depends	on	which	variant	of	retributivism	and	which	variant	of	pre-
punishment	she	endorses.	With	two	versions	of	each	position,	we	have	a	total	of	four	
combinations.	I	will	now	try	to	answer	the	question	for	each	combination.	
	
Recall	that	the	discussion	of	pre-punishment	tends	to	begin	with	seeing	whether	it	can	be	
justified	when	post-punishment	is	not	available,	whilst	the	theoretical	arguments,	resting	as	
they	do	on	not	placing	any	important	moral	line	between	punishment	occurring	before	or	
after	the	crime,	tend	to	suggest	that,	all	else	equal,	we	should	be	indifferent	between	pre-	and	
post-punishment.	The	most	surprising	finding	then,	is	that	the	combination	of	Time-Sensitive	
Retributivism	and	Pre-Desert	pre-punishment	actually	tells	us	that	pre-punishment	is	always	
preferable	to	post-punishment.	For	the	Time-Sensitive	Retributivist	there	is	a	retributivist	
injustice	when	someone	who	deserves	punishment	is	yet	to	be	punished,	and	things	get	worse	
the	longer	this	goes	on.	For	those	who	reject	the	idea	of	Pre-Desert,	the	clock	starts	ticking	the	
moment	the	crime	is	committed	–	the	person	deserves	punishment	from	this	point.	For	those	
who	buy	the	idea	of	Pre-Desert,	however,	the	clock	starts	ticking	the	moment	the	person	
becomes	deserving	of	punishment,	which	occurs	prior	to	the	crime.	I	will	not	try	to	say	here	
exactly	when	this	moment	is,	but	once	the	person	deserves	punishment,	there	is	a	retributive	
injustice	in	their	not	being	punished,	and	the	Time-Sensitive	Retributivist	will	want	to	see	
justice	done	–	i.e.,	punishment	delivered	–	as	quickly	as	possible.	
                                                                                                                                                  
escape	this	entailment,	then	perhaps	Debt	Pre-Punishment	can	too.	Second,	again,	retributive	post-
punishment	may	have	this	entailment	when	it	comes	to	the	wrongly	convicted.	If	I	have	suffered	the	
punishment	for	a	murder,	am	I	entitled	to	a	murder	without	punishment?	(I	am	indebted	to	Kit	
Wellman’s	unpublished	work	here).	Third,	that	‘the	offender	is	pro	tanto	‘owed’	his	crime’	does	not	
entail	he	is	all-things-considered	entitled	to	it,	or	that	we	are	not	permitted	to	stop	him,	should	that	
option	become	available	(and,	in	such	a	case,	we	would	surely	want	to	say	that	he	should	be	
compensated	for	the	pre-punishment	he	endured).	So,	the	inference	from	Debt	Pre-punishment	to	the	
offender	being	‘owed’	his	crime	may	not	be	as	damaging	as	first	appears.	
10	
 
	
What	would	the	Time-Sensitive	Retributivist	say	if	we	were	to	couple	that	view	with	the	Debt	
version	of	pre-punishment?	The	Time-Sensitive	Retributivist	wants	to	minimize	retributive	
injustice	(whilst	considering	longer	periods	of	injustice	to	be	greater	injustice),	and	so	(all	else	
equal)	prefers	injustice	to	last	a	shorter	rather	than	a	longer	time.	On	the	Debt	version	of	pre-
punishment,	we	must	balance	the	injustice	of	punishing	beforehand	against	the	injustice	of	
punishing	afterwards.	If	we	can	punish	only	slightly	early	or	very	late,	this	is	a	consideration	in	
favour	of	pre-punishment	for	this	combination	of	views.	If	the	two	forms	of	injustice	are	
equivalent,	the	Time-Sensitive	Retributivist	will	prefer	whichever	of	the	available	pre-	and	
post-punishments	is	temporally	closest	to	the	commission	of	the	crime.	
	
However,	the	Time-Sensitive	Retributivists	who	hold	the	Debt	version	will	not	necessarily	
view	the	two	forms	of	injustice	as	equivalent,	and	therefore	they	will	not	necessarily	simply	
look	at	the	temporal	distance	(in	either	direction)	between	crime	and	punishment.	The	two	
forms	of	injustice	may	well	be	importantly	different:	if	we	pre-punish,	there	follows	a	period	of	
unjust	punishment,	which	will	be	rectified	once	the	crime	is	committed;	if	we	post-punish,	
there	follows	of	period	of	unjust	non-punishment,	which	will	be	rectified	once	the	offender	is	
punished.		
	
We	can	plausibly	see	these	two	forms	of	injustice	as	morally	distinct.	When	we	endorse	robust	
procedural	protections,	such	as	the	presumption	of	innocence	and	a	high	criminal	standard	of	
proof,	we	try	to	ensure	that	we	do	not	unjustly	punish	people,	even	when	these	robust	
protections	make	it	likely	that	we	will	deliver	less	just	punishment	as	well.	These	robust	
protections	are	often	defended	on	the	grounds	that	unjust	non-punishment	is	heavily	
preferable	to	unjust	punishment.	For	example,	consider	William	Blackstone’s	famous	(and	
widely	endorsed)	claim	that	‘it	is	better	that	ten	guilty	persons	escape,	than	that	one	innocent	
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suffer’20,	which	implies	that	we	balance	unjust	punishment	against	unjust	non-punishment,	
but	that	the	scales	are	tipped	heavily	in	favour	of	avoiding	the	former.	
	
If	our	defendant-friendly	procedural	principles	are	justified	by	appeal	to	the	claim	that	(all	else	
equal)	unjust	punishment	is	inherently	worse	than	unjust	non-punishment	then	that	will	tell	
us	something	important.21	Time-Sensitive	Retributivists	who	hold	such	a	view	should	generally	
prefer	post-punishment	to	pre-punishment,	since	the	period	of	injustice	involved	in	post-
punishment	is	a	period	of	unjust	non-punishment.	However,	even	in	such	a	case,	adherents	of	
Time-Sensitive	Retributivism	and	Debt	pre-punishment	could	in	some	cases	favour	pre-
punishment,	where	an	available	pre-punishment	was	far	closer	to	the	commission	of	the	crime	
than	the	available	post-punishments.	
	
What	of	the	In	the	End	Retributivist?	If	the	In	the	End	Retributivist	endorses	the	Pre-Desert	
view	of	pre-punishment,	then	she	will	be	genuinely	indifferent	between	pre-	and	post-
punishment.	Both	are	punishments	that	come	after	the	offender	becomes	deserving	and	both	
give	the	offender	what	he	deserves.	The	In	the	End	Retributivist	is	equally	satisfied	either	
way.22	
                                                
20	William	Blackstone,	Commentaries	on	the	laws	of	England,	volume	4,	19th	ed.	(London:	S.	Sweet,	1836),	
p.	358.		
21	They	could	also	be	justified	by	the	thought	that	we	must	never	knowingly	punish	the	innocent	and	
that	we	must	only	punish	when	we	are	sure	the	accused	is	guilty.	This	is	a	deontological	principle,	
rather	than	the	product	of	balancing	potential	injustices.	Elsewhere,	I	have	referred	to	these	two	
variants	of	the	presumption	of	innocence	as	the	overriding	approach	(the	approach	considered	in	this	
footnote)	and	the	outweighing	approach	(the	approach	considered	in	the	main	text).	If	one	adopts	the	
overriding	approach,	and	believes	that	we	may	never	punish	while	knowing	the	offender	is	non-
deserving,	then	one	should	reject	the	Debt	variant	of	pre-punishment	altogether.	See:	Patrick	Tomlin,	
‘Extending	the	Golden	Thread?	Criminalisation	and	the	Presumption	of	Innocence’	in	Journal	of	
Political	Philosophy	21	(2013):	44-66.	See,	in	particular,	pp.	49-52.	
22	There	are	contingent	reasons,	based	on	uncertainty	about	the	future,	for	In	the	End	Retributivists	to	
prefer	punishment	sooner	rather	than	later	(see	Tomlin,	‘Time	and	Retribution’,	pp.	679-680)	but	since	
we	stipulate	away	uncertainty	about	the	future	in	thinking	about	pre-punishment,	these	reasons	are	not	
relevant	here.	Jospeh	Q.	Adams’	recent	argument	for	retributivists	(sometimes)	preferring	pre-
punishment	rests	on	assuming	(near)	perfect	knowledge	about	the	future	commission	of	the	crime,	
whilst	assuming	uncertainty	about	the	availability	of	post-punishment.	See	Adams,	‘Retributive	
Prepunishment.’	
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Deciding	what	the	In	the	End	Retributivist	should	say	if	she	endorses	the	Debt	Version	of	pre-
punishment	is	more	difficult.	In	stating	her	indifference	to	the	time	between	crime	and	post-
punishment,	the	In	the	End	Retributivist	appears	to	claim	that	punishments	‘cancel	out’	
crimes,	and	that	it	doesn’t	matter	when	this	happens.	If	we	read	this	as	denying	either	that	the	
period	between	crime	and	punishment	represents	a	period	of	injustice,	or	that	the	size	of	such	
injustice	morally	matters,	then	the	In	the	End	Retributivist	should	presumably	view	pre-	and	
post-punishment	on	a	par.	If	all	that	matters,	retributively,	is	that	people	get	the	punishment	
they	deserve	at	some	point	(including	prior	to	actually	deserving	it)	then	the	In	the	End	
Retributivist	will	not	mind	whether	punishment	precedes	or	follows	crime.	
	
If,	however,	the	In	the	End	Retributivist	is	prepared	to	acknowledge	the	period	between	crime	
and	punishment	as	a	period	of	injustice,	whilst	simply	denying	that	the	duration	of	this	period	
contributes	to	the	size	of	the	injustice,	then	she	will	want	to	compare	the	injustice	of	
punishing	before	with	the	injustice	of	punishing	after.	As	before,	if	she	prefers	unjust	non-
punishment	to	unjust	punishment,	then	she	will	always	prefer	post-punishment.	For,	unlike	
the	Time-Sensitive	Retributivist,	the	temporal	proximity	of	the	available	pre-punishments	will	
not	matter	–	duration	of	injustice	is	irrelevant.	
	
V	Conclusions	
Discussions	of	pre-punishment	seem	to	suggest	that	pre-punishment	is,	at	best,	a	second-best	
to	post-punishment,	whilst	also	suggesting	that	neither	pre-	or	post-punishment	is	inherently	
preferable.	From	the	perspective	of	retributivism,	however,	neither	of	these	is	clearly	the	case.	
In	order	to	show	this,	I	have	tried	to	make	largely	unrecognised	delineations	both	within	
retributivism	and	within	pre-punishment.	Only	if	we	are	In	the	End	Retributivists	who	accept	
the	Debt	version	of	pre-punishment	should	we	view	pre-punishment	as	inferior.	And	only	if	
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we	are	In	the	End	Retributivists	who	accept	the	Pre-Desert	version	of	pre-punishment	should	
we	view	pre-	and	post-punishment	as	on	a	par.	Those	who	believe	that	time	matters	when	it	
comes	to	delivering	retributive	justice	(i.e.,	Time-Sensitive	Retributivists)	will	at	least	
sometimes,	and	perhaps	always,	prefer	pre-	to	post-punishment.	Those	who	accept	such	
combinations	of	views	ought	to	change	the	way	they	look	at	our	ordinary	post-punishment	
practices	–	they	are	(at	least	sometimes)	second	best	forms	of	justice,	forced	on	us	by	the	
disparity	between	our	abilities	in	hindsight	and	foresight.	
	
Some	may	find	such	combinations	ruled	out	by	the	very	entailments	that	I	have	drawn	from	
them.	Rather	than	a	novel	conclusion,	these	theorists	will	take	some	of	the	entailments	noted	
above	to	be	reductios	of	certain	combinations.	For	example,	if	the	combination	of	Time-
Sensitive	Retributivism	and	Pre-Desert	pre-punishment	leads	us	to	the	conclusion	that	pre-
punishment	is	intrinsically	and	consistently	preferable	to	post-punishment,	then	some	may	
conclude	‘so	much	the	worse	for	that	combination.’	Therefore,	they	will	insist	that	at	least	one	
of	the	two	positions	be	rejected.	
	
Is	such	a	combination,	and	the	entailment,	unthinkable?	Is	it	implausible	to	think	that	pre-
punishment	is	preferable	to	post-punishment?	The	first	thing	to	say	here	is	that	our	entire	
discussion	has	been	premised	on	the	controversial	assumption	that	pre-punishment	can	serve	
retributive	justice	and	is	permissible.	Those	who	reject	out	of	hand	the	idea	that	pre-
punishment	could	be	preferable	to	post-punishment	may	be	motivated	by	the	fact	that	they	
dismiss,	or	are	at	least	sceptical	of,	the	claim	that	pre-punishment	can	be	(in	theory)	just	and	
permissible.	But	once	we	have	accepted	that	pre-punishment	is	permissible,	it	seems	less	of	a	
stretch	for	the	retributivist	to	concede	that	it	may	be	(in	principle)	preferable.	I	am	myself	
very	doubtful	of	the	position	that	pre-punishment	is	permissible,	or	that	it	serves	justice,	but	if	
it	is,	I	don’t	think	it	is	especially	worrying	if	it	turns	out	to	be	preferable.	That	second	step	
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seems	much	smaller	than	the	first	(accepting	pre-punishment	as	permissible).	The	second	
thing	to	say	to	this	is	that	it	must	be	remembered	that	the	claim	is	that	pre-punishment	is	
preferable	in	principle,	and	from	the	point	of	view	of	retributivism.	There	are	plenty	of	reasons	
remaining	for	the	retributivist	to	prefer	post-punishment,	both	because	of	our	epistemic	
abilities,	and	because	of	other	values	or	reasons.	
	
In	this	essay	I	have	not	argued	for	retributivism	or	the	permissibility	of	pre-punishment.	
However,	as	well	as	trying	to	see	what	retributivists	might	say	about	pre-punishment,	I	have	
tried	to	contribute	to	the	scholarship	of	both	positions.	In	terms	of	retributivism,	the	
distinction	(and	choice)	between	the	Time-Sensitive	and	In	the	End	variants	is	not	generally	
recognised	and	discussed,	but	it	has	serious	ramifications	both	for	how	retributivists	regard	
pre-punishment	as	well	as	how	they	view	the	timing	and	mode	of	ordinary	punishment.23	In	
terms	of	pre-punishment,	it	seems	that,	from	a	retributivist	point	of	view	at	least,	two	
completely	different	arguments	can	be	offered	in	its	favour,	and	traces	of	both	can	be	found	in	
the	literature.	Therefore,	greater	clarity	can	be	achieved	by	focusing	arguments	both	for	and	
against	pre-punishment	on	the	Pre-Desert	(or	related	positions	like	Pre-Liability,	or	Pre-
Forfeiture)	and	Debt	variants.	
	
                                                
23	Tomlin,	‘Time	and	Retribution’.	
